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I.

INTRODUCTION

The coming of hostile takeovers to Japan has been
anticipated, and anticipated, and anticipated. Each report of
a reduction in the size of crossholdings among Japanese
companies and in the size of Japanese bank stockholdings in
their clients has given rise to an expectation that now, at
last, hostile offers would emerge. It is not surprising that
commentators looked forward, optimistically, to the arrival
of a potentially disruptive takeover technique. The extended

* Marc & Eva Stern Professor of Law and Business, Columbia Law
School, and Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford
Law School. This article was originally delivered as a lecture in the
Symposium on Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: Prospects and
Policy, sponsored by the Columbia Law School Center for Japanese Legal
Studies and the firm of Mori, Hamada & Matsumoto, and retains some of
the informality of that format. I note in particular my gratitude to Mori,
Hamada & Matsumoto for their hospitality during my visit to Japan for
this Symposium, and to Hideki Kanda, Satoshi Kawai, and Curtis J.
Milhaupt for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.
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Japanese recession, together with management resistance to
internally implemented restructurings and the barriers to
externally imposed restructurings, has created the potential
for substantial private and social gain from rationalizing
production.
Curtis Milhaupt reports that as of 2000,
thirteen percent of the Tokyo Stock Exchange nonfinancial
firms traded at below their liquidation value, 1 a phenomenon
that in the United States led to a wave of bust-up hostile
takeovers during the 1980s. 2 Nonetheless, in Japan the
much anticipated hostile takeovers did not materialize. In
turn, the absence of takeovers resulted in little clamor for
defensive tactics; without a threat on the horizon, no demand
for protection developed.
A number of events now suggest that the long wait for
hostile transactions in Japan may be approaching its end.
First, Japanese corporate law has been extensively amended
since the early 1990s to make the structure of corporate
governance more flexible and to enhance the potential for
For example,
meaningful monitoring of management.
merger procedures have been simplified; a system for
employee stock option compensation has been established;
the creation of a holding company system through spinoffs
has been legalized and facilitated; companies have been
given the option of adopting a U.S. style board committeebased governance system as an alternative to the traditional
statutory auditor system; and filing fees for derivative
litigation have been reduced, resulting in a ten-fold increase
in derivative litigation. 3

1

CURTIS J. MILHAUPT, A LOST DECADE FOR JAPANESE CORPORATE
GoVERNANCE REFORM?: WHAT'S CHANGED, WHAT HAsN'T, AND WHY
(Columbia Law School Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies, Working Paper No.
234, 2003).
2
RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS ch.9.E (2d ed. 1995); Ronald J. Gilson, The

Political Ecology of Takeovers: Thoughts on Harmonizing the European
Corporate Governance Environment, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 161 (1992).
3

Curtis Milhaupt details the pace and scope of corporate law reform.

See MILHAUPT, supra note 1; Curtis J. Milhaupt & Mark D. West,
Institutional Change and M&A in Japan: Diversity Through Deals, in
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Second, a small amount of hostile activity has actually
occurred. In 2000 and 2002, M&A Consulting, a Japanese
takeover firm, initiated control contests directed at Japanese
firms: in 2000, a hostile bid for Shoei Corporation, a real
estate and electronic parts company, and in 2002, a proxy
fight over dividend policy at Tokyo Style. 4 Both failed, "in
large part because banks and institutional investors gave
unconditional support to existing management when the
unwelcome bidder appeared,''5 just as they have in the past.
Other efforts, but now by foreign bidders, have proven more
successful.
In 2000, the management of International
Digital Communications ("IDC"), a midsized Japanese
telephone company, accepted a stock swap with Nippon
Telephone and Telegraph Corp. Britain's Cable & Wireless
then made an uninvited competing bid offering slightly more
cash than the value of the Nippon stock that IDC
shareholders would receive under the transaction IDC
management favored. IDC shareholders voted to accept the
uninvited Cable & Wireless bid. 6 Also in 2000, Boehringer
Ingelheim, a German pharmaceutical company made an
unsolicited offer for the Japanese SS Pharmaceuticals
("SSP").
Boehringer succeeded in increasing its SSP
holdings from approximately twenty percent to thirty-six
percent, which amounted to a blocking position, and thereby
gave the German company effective control. 7
Third, informed observers, whose professional practices
depend upon that status, are now sending a different signal.
They now seem to be acting, rather than simply talking, as if
these events actually herald the coming of Japanese hostile
takeovers, which is an important signal. Professor Milhaupt
reports that "many investment banks are no longer
GLOBAL MARKETS, DOMESTIC INSTITUTIONS: CORPORATE LAW AND
GoVERNANCE IN A NEW ERA OF CROSS-BORDER DEALS 295 (Curtis J.

Milhaupt ed., 2003)
4
See MILHAUPT, supra note 1.
5
MILHAUPT, supra note 1, at 20.
6
Robert G. Wray, Japan: The Next M&A Frontier, THE M&A LAWYER,
March 2001, at 1.
7
Id.; see MILHAUPT, supra note 1, at 11.

24

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2004

discouraging foreign clients from hostile bids, and large
numbers of Japanese managers are seeking professional
advice on defensive matters."8 Of course, supply typically
follows demand, and law firms now trumpet the belief that
changes in the Commercial Code make poison pills possible
in Japan. 9
It is this last point-the coming of the poison pill to
Japan-on which I focus on here. I have expressed the view
that the broad sanction of the poison pill in the United
States has been a mistake. 10 The opposing view, effectively
championed by Martin Lipton, the poison pill's architect, is
that the pill ultimately did not discourage hostile takeovers
because courts came to play a mediating role that gave
target boards the ability to secure a better price but in the
end did not often lead boards to finally block an offer.U
While I will take up the claim that experience has rendered
the pill benign in the United States/ 2 the stakes are much
higher in Japan than they were in the United States. The
combination of crossholdings, bank holdings and
8

Milhaupt & West, supra note 3, at 322.
It is beyond my ambitions here to track the critical Commercial Code
changes that appear to validate a poison pill and the alternative forms
that a Japanese poison pill might take. I note only that the fact that
Japanese poison pills would differ formally from their U.S. progenitor
demonstrates the importance of functional as opposed to formal
convergence of corporate governance practices. See Ronald J. Gilson,
9

Globalization of Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form or Function,
49 AM. J. COMP. L. 329 (2001). For assessments of the pill structures
allowed by the Commercial Code changes, see Satoshi Kawai, Poison Pill
in Japan, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 11; Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison
Pill Comes to Japan-Part 1, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL,
March 2002, at 1; and Arthur M. Mitchell, The Poison Pill Comes to
Japan-Part II, THE METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL, April 2002, at 1.
1
° For recent expressions, see Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years
Later (And What We Can Do About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491 (2001);
Ronald J. Gilson, Lipton & Rowe's Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply,
27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37 (2002).
11
See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A
Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002); Martin Lipton, Pills,
Polls and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1037 (2002).
12
See infra text accompanying note 46-48.
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governmental stasis that has frozen Japanese corporate
governance leaves hostile takeovers as one of the few
external mechanisms for systemic change that existing
institutions do not block or at least greatly impede. Most
important, the institutional infrastructure that ultimately
reduced the defensive impact of the poison pill in the United
States does not now exist in Japan. Thus, the poison pill has
the potential to be greatly more pernicious in Japan than it
has been in the United States, both because of the absence of
ameliorating institutions in Japan, and because the impact
is likely to be greater because in Japan the forces for change
in industrial organization outside the market for corporate
control are significantly less strong than in the U.SY
My assessment of the coming of the poison pill in Japan
proceeds as follows. Part II lays the groundwork for the
analysis by putting hostile takeovers, a quintessentially U.S.
phenomenon, in an international and functional context.
Part III takes up the general problem posed by defensive
tactics and Part IV considers which participants in the
corporate governance structure police the operation of the
poison pill in the U.S.
Part V then evaluates the
implications of the U.S. experience for the development of
the poison pill in Japan. Part VI concludes.

II. HOSTILE TAKEOVERS: THE INTERNATIONAL
AND FUNCTIONAL CONTEXT
While the 1980s hostile takeover wave in the United
States was viewed with horror outside the U.S. and U.K.,
international attitudes toward hostile takeovers have
changed markedly in recent years. The change is most
apparent in Europe. At the time when hostile takeovers
emerged most forcefully in the U.S., the European attitude
toward takeovers was extremely negative. In 1988, the CEO
of Deutsche Bank offered a German view: hostile takeovers

13

See Milhaupt & West, supra note 3, at 308-10.

26

COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2004

were the "blunders of American capitalism."14 The following
year, Frant;ois Mitterand, the President of the French
Republic, described takeovers as "gangsterism and the law of
the strongest."15
By 2001, European opinion had shifted dramatically. In
June 2001 the proposed Thirteenth Directive on Takeovers
that had emerged through the conciliation process reflected a
central pro-takeover theme; following the British City Code
on Takeovers, 16 the Directive prohibited target boards from
taking any defensive action that interfered with the
shareholders' ability to accept a hostile offerP Surprisingly,
the agreed upon text was defeated in the European
Parliament by a tie vote, but the overall professional
sentiment did not seem to change.
Following the
Parliament's deadlock, a "High Level Group of Company Law
Experts," whose creation was promised to Parliament during
the conciliation process to consider a number of issues left
unresolved in the proposed Thirteenth Directive, was named
and its charge extended to making a more general statement
of what should be the Thirteenth Directive's operative
principles. From the High Level Group's report, a revised
directive would be crafted.
The High Level Group Report is a remarkable document.
First, it demonstrates clearly how much the European
attitude toward takeovers had changed. The Report's central
concem was not the legitimacy of defensive tactics-that

14
Emst-Ludwig Von Thadden, On the Efficiency of the Market for
Corporate Control, 43 KYKLOS 635, 635 (1990) (citing FRANKFURTER
ALLEGMEINE ZEITUNG, Dec. 23, 1988).
15
!d. (citing LE MONDE, Feb. 14, 1989).
16
The full text of the City Code is available at www.thetakeoverpanel.
org.uk.
17
Proposal for a Thirteenth European Parliament and Council
Directive on Company Law Conceming Takeover Bids, art. 9, 1996 O.J. (C
162) 5, COM(95)655 final, revised by 1997 O.J. (C 378) 10, COM(97)565
final. This proposal was ultimately rejected by the European Parliament.
The current proposal, which maintains this position, was proposed in
February 2002. Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and
ofthe Council on Takeover Bids, O.J. (C 45) 1, COM(2002)534 final.
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matter had been resolved in favor of shareholder choice. 18
Rather, the focus is on the structural barriers to takeovers in
individual countries that prevent a level playing field within
Europe for hostile takeovers.
Companies organized in
countries without a tradition of protective governance
structures such as dual class common stock, voting caps, or
the right of special classes of shareholders to name the
directors, are at a substantial disadvantage. Companies
organized in countries with protective structures can make
hostile offers for companies organized in countries without
them, but would be protected against hostile offers directed
at them.
The High Level Group Report responds to the level
playing field problem by proposing a "break through
principle" that invalidates barriers to the exercise of voting
control by the holder of a majority of the equity interests
after a bidder acquires seventy-five percent of the equity of
the target company (regardless of voting power), in effect
limiting multiple voting rights to two to one. 19 Note that the
High Level Group Report is dramatically more protakeover
than the most favorable reading of U.S. takeover law, which
would leave in place structural control devices that either
predate a public offering or were approved by shareholders.
Thus, at least professional opinion and the opinion of the
European Commission had come a long way since 1988.

18
The High Level Group Report affirmed the principle of shareholder
choice: target shareholder approval was required before the target could
take "any action which may result in the frustration of the bid ... notably
before the issuance of shares which may result in a lasting impediment to
the offeror obtaining control." Indeed, the Report would not credit
shareholder approval of the creation of a poison pill unless it came after
the hostile takeover offer occurred. Jaap W. Winter et al., Report of the
High Level Group of Company Law Experts on Issues Related to Takeover
Bids in the European Union (Jan. 10, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=315322 [hereinafter High Level Group Report]. In the U.S., of
course, a poison pill can be created before any offer is made and without
shareholder approval. See Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346
(Del. 1985).
19
High Level Group Report, supra note 18.
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So what changed? The key is understanding that
corporate acquisitions function as an equilibrating
mechanism. From this perspective, acquisitions are an
important mechanism for economic change and hold out the
promise of facilitating the particular economic change of
greatest interest to the European Union-the creation of a
single market.
To see this, think of a simple two-period model.2° In
period one, the economy is in organizational equilibrium. All
assets are owned by the entity that can most effectively use
them, conditional on existing organizational and industrial
technology, on the politically dictated regulatory regime, and
on the transaction costs of shifting the use of the assets
either by moving them between entities or altering their use
within an entity. Between periods one and two, a change in
technology occurs that alters the most efficient distribution
of assets. For example, the change may be scientific,
creating economies of scope between two previously
unrelated technologies, or it may be political, creating
economies of scale as a result of a reduction in regulatory
barriers to cross-border trade, or it may be transactional,
reducing the cost of transferring assets between corporations
by creating a new financing vehicle like junk bonds.
Corporate acquisitions occur in period two as the market for
assets responds to the shift in the efficient boundary of the
firm. The idea is simply a market response to changes that
implicate organizational form.
From this perspective, the market for corporate control is
an equilibrating process that reallocates ownership of assets
following a change in technology to the entity that then
values them most highly. Hostile takeovers play a special
role in this equilibration. Sometimes target management
may resist the equilibration process. Part of the problem
results from a good faith difference in views. For example,
when the destabilizing change is industry wide, it may be
particularly difficult to recognize its implications from inside

20

This discussion draws on Gilson, supra note 2, at 163-64.
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the industry. 21 But part of the problem also results from the
fact that even efficient change creates dislocation. Target
management is typically replaced, target facilities are often
closed, and levels of employment may be affected. Hostile
takeovers are at best Kaldor-Hicks, rather than Pareto
efficient, and target management typically will be among the
losers. Thus, resistance to equilibration is hardly surprising.
From this perspective, the change in European attitudes
toward hostile takeovers is understandable. The expansion
of the internal market, together with growing globalization,
altered the efficient scale in many industries. Hostile
takeovers have the potential to accomplish the necessary
reallocation of assets without the delay and political
posturing associated with government action.
The same potential helps explain the perennial
expectation that hostile takeovers are about to come to
Japan. Describing the lengthy Japanese recession, the Wall
Street Journal recently reported that "a combination of
ineffectual government and feeble corporate-restructuring
efforts snuffed out growth, which has averaged just 1.1%
annually in the past 11 years."22 Thus, an assessment of
defensive tactics generally, and poison pills in particular,
should appropriately focus on whether they impede hostile
takeovers from invigorating the equilibration process in
Japan.

III. THE PROBLEM OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS
The recent amendments to the Commercial Code that
make technically possible a poison pill-a device that,
whatever its particular form, functions to substantially
dilute a hostile bidder's holdings if the bidder's holdings
exceed a triggering percentage--only frames the question of
whether the poison pill will function to prevent hostile
takeovers from playing an important equilibrating role.
21

See Randall Mark et al., Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate
Control, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 842 (1989).
22
Sebastian Moffett & Phred Dvorak, After Long Decline, Japan's
Economy is Stirring to Life, WALL ST. J., Nov. 10, 2003, at A1.
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Most simply, the amendments do not themselves address the
obligations of the board when a hostile bid is actually made.
The bidder will condition its offer on the target board
redeeming the pill to avoid the dilution that would result
from the offer's closing. Can the board simply decline to
disarm the pill and thereby prevent shareholders from ever
having the opportunity to accept or reject the bid? Because a
poison pill is only the most effective defensive tactic,
answering this question requires understanding the role of
defensive tactics generally.
Whenever we observe a target firm deploying a defensive
tactic, one or more of three motives will be present. First,
target management may be acting out of self-interest.
Whether motivated by keeping their own jobs or by
protecting other stakeholders from the costs imposed by
economic change, target management may try to preserve
the status quo despite the fact that the shareholders would
be best served by being allowed to accept the hostile offer.
Second, target management may be acting as the
shareholders' bargaining agent. In this case, management is
using defensive tactics to negotiate a higher price from the
hostile bidder or to seek out a more favorable competitive
bid.
Finally, target management may be using defensive
tactics to influence the timing of the corporation's
acquisition. Management may genuinely believe that selling
the corporation at this time is not in the shareholders'
interest and, critically, that shareholders will make the
wrong decision even if management explains its views. 23
While the short run effect of defensive tactics undertaken for
this reason is the same as with defensive tactics undertaken
for self-serving reasons-the offer is defeated if the defensive
tactics are successful-in this case the motivation is

23

See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate
Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to the Proportionality
Review?, 44 Bus. LAw. 247 (1989) (developing the concept of substantive
coercion to cover circumstances when shareholders will reject
management's advice even though management is right).
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different: the managers believe they are acting to maximize
shareholder value.
The fact that defensive tactics may have different
motivations poses two central questions at the heart of
assessing the potential impact of the poison pill. Most
important, how is the process policed so that defensive
tactics motivated by management self-interest are never
allowed, defensive tactics motivated by an effort to secure
the best price for shareholders are always allowed, 24 and
defensive tactics motivated by a timing claim are carefully
evaluated to prevent claims of timing from cloaking selfinterested behavior? The critical operational question is the
identity of the policeman.
As I have developed elsewhere/5 the initial debate in the
U.S. was driven by two interest groups who advanced
diametrically opposite views. Takeover defense lawyers
argued that board decisions with respect to tender offers
should be treated like any other board decision concerning
an acquisition proposal: the business judgment rule should
operate to allocate the decision to deploy defensive tactics,
including whether to adopt or redeem a pill, to the target
board. 26 Academics, in contrast, advanced the view that
tender offers are themselves an important corporate
governance device, central to acquisitions operating as an
equilibrating process. Efficient equilibration requires that
shareholders make the ultimate decision concerning whether
a hostile bid will succeed. 27 Interestingly, the two sides did
24

While the appropriateness of this behavior seems self-evident now,
in early years it was the subject of significant debate. Compare Ronald J.
Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure Passivity in Tender Offer
Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1982), and Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN.
L. REV. 23 (1982), with Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
25
See Gilson, supra note 10.
26
This view was most effectively advanced by Martin Lipton. For the
classic formulation, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101 (1979).
27
See Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The
Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819
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agree on one important thing: "courts should not determine
the outcome of the largest business transactions in history." 28
In the end, it was the court's role to decide who would
police management's conduct in a hostile takeover. 29 Not
surprisingly, they chose themselves despite the preferences
of academics and practitioners. Since 1985, Delaware law
has dictated that, in the end, the courts would decide
whether a board decision not to redeem a poison pill would
be credited. 30 While I have been critical of how the Delaware
courts, especially the Delaware Supreme Court, have
implemented the obligation they took on in the face of
skepticism from both the bar and the academy, the impact of
that rather poor performance has been more benign than the
Delaware Supreme Court's rhetoric might lead one to expect.
Even Martin Lipton, the poison pill's architect and a forceful
expositor of the view that the pill gives the target the right to
''just say no" to a hostile bid, recently stated: "[T]he incidence
of a target's actually saying 'never' [to a hostile bid] is so rare
as not to be a real-world problem."31 As I will stress in Part
IV.C., I believe Lipton's assessment understates the poison
(1981); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV.
1161 (1981); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers, 95 HARv. L. REV. 1028 (1982).
28
Gilson, supra note 10, at 496.
29
Chancellor Chandler puts the issue more felicitously: "Corporate
law seeks to balance the rights of the owners (shareholders) and the duties
of management (officers and directors). Much of this balance is achieved
by imposing fiduciary duties on management while granting only limited
rights to shareholder to participate in business operations." William B.
Chandler III, Hostile M&A and the Poison Pill in Japan: A Judicial
Perspective, 2004 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 45. Maintaining that balance, in
this view, is the role of the courts. I note that this view is not without cost.
Particularly with respect to takeovers, if the balance point announced by
the court is not clearly observable to those structuring transactions, then
the judicial role becomes that of Delphic oracle. This is not an easy job for
judges, and results in, from my perspective, the cardinal judicial sin:
doctrine that makes transaction planning harder rather than easier.
30
See Gilson, supra note 10, at 496-97 (discussing Delaware Supreme
Court decisions in Household International and Unocal).
31
Lipton, supra note 11, at 1065.
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pill's continuing impact; however, I agree that the result has
been better than one could have feared. Thus, assessing the
impact of the Commercial Code amendments that now make
the pill possible in Japan requires an understanding of the
infrastructure in the U.S. that prevented the pill from
operating according to its formal terms. On its face the pill
authorizes the board to invoke a poison pill to block a hostile
takeover and thus to create a serious barrier to the operation
of the market for corporate control. Something outside the
pill itself-and therefore outside the Commercial Code
amendments-prevented the pill from achieving its
destructive potential.

IV. WHO POLICES THE PILL IN THE U.S.?
As we have seen, three different institutionsindependent directors, shareholders, and the courts-have
the capacity to police the actual operation of the poison pill
to prevent it from being used to preserve management's
position, and to assess management's good faith belief about
the right time to sell the company. A critical feature of the
infrastructure that constrained the operation of the poison
pill in the United States is that all three institutions
performed that function.
A. Independent Directors
Independent directors are the first barrier to the use of a
poison pill to block, as opposed to negotiate, a hostile
takeover bid. Three changes over the years since the
Delaware Supreme Court sanctioned the poison pilP2 have
catalyzed the role of independent directors as a constraint on
management self-interest in responding to a hostile takeover
bid.
First, independent directors increased in both number
and degree of independence. Long before Sarbanes-Oxley
and the new stock exchange rules on independence, most
large U.S. public corporations had a majority of outside, non32

Moran v. Household Int'l. Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
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employee directors. At the same time, outside directors
came to be more independent. Directors who did business
with the corporation as supplier or professional adviser gave
way to directors who had no financial ties to the corporation.
Second, the Delaware courts articulated a clear
normative statement about the role that independent
directors should play in evaluating a hostile takeover bid.
Independent directors, the courts stated pointedly, are not
merely advisors to management with no stake in the
outcome when confronted with a hostile bid. In the takeover
area, courts came to expect independent directors to be the
real decision makers and "to be the controlling parties in a
target company's conduct of its defense. Only when the
directors appear to have abdicated their role to management
-think of Van Gorkom, Macmillan, and QVC-will the court
intervene."33
Finally, public opinion and the opinions of independent
directors changed conceming hostile takeovers themselves.
As the gains that result from hostile takeover driven
restructuring became widely understood, the structure of
executive compensation changed in a fashion that reduced
management resistance to takeovers.
So long as
management compensation had a relatively small equity
component, entrenchment was a value maximizing strategy
for management-a hostile takeover that benefited
shareholders by paying them a premium for their shares did
not benefit managers, who lost their jobs. During the period
in which hostile takeovers became a fixture of the U.S.
corporate landscape, the portion of managerial compensation
that was equity based increased markedly. From 1980 to
1994, equity-based compensation as a percentage of total
CEO compensation increased from twenty percent to almost
fifty percent. 34 The shift to equity-based compensation
accelerated in the 1994 to 2001 period, with option-based

33

Gilson, supra note 10, at 512 (citations omitted).
Brian J. Hall & Jeffrey B. Liebman, Are CEOs Really Paid Like
Bureaucrats?, 112 Q. J. ECON. 653 (1998).
34
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compensation more than doubling over that period. 35 The
result was to align the incentives of management and
shareholders with respect to company operations generally,
but especially with respect to takeovers; a premium offer
benefited both. 36
Thus, independent directors came to understand that
they were to be the central decision makers in dealing with a
hostile offer and to recognize that hostile takeovers were
part of the proper functioning of the capital market rather
than an attack on the corporate citadel. The circle was
closed by a shift in the form of management compensation
that reduced the pressure on outside directors by reducing
the financial threat hostile takeovers posed to management.
As a result, both directors and management were less likely
to use the poison pill as an entrenchment device as opposed
to a bargaining tool.
B. Courts
The story of the Delaware court's development of the law
of hostile takeovers is too long and tortured to be recounted
here. 37 A fair reading of that path provides some support for
Martin Lipton's assessment that target boards in the end
have not often used the pill to block a hostile bid. Despite
the Delaware Supreme Court's frustratingly fuzzy and
inconsistent rhetoric, the chancery court's decisions still

35
Brian J. Hall & Kevin J. Murphy, Stock Options for Undiversifwd
Executives, 33 J. AccT. & ECON. 3 (2002).
36
While explaining what went wrong with U.S. governance as we
approached the turn of the century is far beyond my ambitions here, I note
that it is textbook economics that an increase in the intensity of
management incentives requires a corresponding increase in the intensity
of monitoring of their performance. See PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS,
ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION, AND MANAGEMENT ch.6 (1992). This did not
happen.
37
The early doctrinal history is developed in GILSON & BLACK, supra
note 2, ch.17; the more recent history is recounted in Gilson, supra note
10. Chancellor Chandler's contribution to this Symposium presents a
nuanced account of the story from the perspective of the courts. Chandler,
supra note 29.
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fairly suggest that the validity of defensive tactics will be
independently assessed, even if one cannot avoid the
intuition that the opinions are rhetorically camouflaged for
the benefit of the supreme court. Management justification
of efforts to block a hostile bid based on a claim that the
stock market undervalues the corporation's shares or that
shareholders will be confused by the offer will typically, but
not uniformly, evoke judicial inquiry into the source of those
problems. Perhaps most important, the courts have clarified
one critical premise: the touchstone for decision is
shareholder value.
This does not mean that other
stakeholders are unimportant, but only that their
importance is viewed through the prism of equity value. 38 As
Chancellor Chandler points out, this constrains, but does not
eliminate, managerial discretion; 39 stakeholder concern can
still surface through management claims of a long run
strategy not appreciated by the market.
Thus, despite the Delaware Supreme Court's rhetorical
deference to director power to deploy defensive tactics, the
chancery court continued to make factually rich assessments
of whether target boards were using the pill to negotiate or
to entrench, 40 surely emboldened by the fact that the
Delaware Supreme Court has yet, now more than fifteen
years after validating the poison pill, to directly address
whether a target board of directors can simply decline to
redeem a poison pill based on the belief that the company is
worth more.
On balance, the Delaware courts have
constrained the mischief that the poison pill could have
causedY

38
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d
173 (Del. 1986).
39
Chandler, supra note 29.
40
The Chancery Court opinion in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore is a clear
example of this phenomenon. 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000).
41
To be sure, as I have urged elsewhere, it would have been better if
the Supreme Court had actually played the role it gave itself in Household
International, but it could have been worse too.
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C. The Shareholders and the Market
Independent of legal rules, institutional investors have
come to impose a market constraint on a target's ability to
use the poison pill to block a takeover bid. The simple fact is
that institutions hold a large percentage, often a majority, of
the stock of publicly traded U.S. companies. While it is
commonplace to note the importance of the large public
pension funds, like the California Public Employees
Retirement System and TIAA-CREF, large mutual funds
also hold very large positions. For example, FMR, the
adviser to the Fidelity family of mutual funds, alone holds
stakes of five percent or more in 288 of the largest 1000
American public corporations in 2000 and 2001. 42 Although
less vocally than the public pension funds, large mutual
funds also have come to oppose the use of poison pills
without shareholder approval. Fidelity's voting policies
state:
If, without shareholder approval, a company's Board
of Directors has instituted a new poison pill plan,
extended an existing plan, or adopted a new plan
upon the expiration of an existing plan during the
last year, we generally withhold votes on the election
of directors at the Annual Meeting following such
action.
Fidelity may vote in favor of a rights plan with
"sunset" provisions: if the plan is linked to a business
strategy that will-in our view-likely result in
greater value for shareholders, if the term is less
than five years, and if shareholder approval is
required to reinstate the expired plan or adopt a new
plan at the end of this term ....

42

Gerald F. Davis & Mina Yoo, The Shrinking World of the Large US
Corporation: Common Ownership and Board Ties, 1990-2001 (June 2003)
(published in French in GERER & COMPRENDRE, December 2003).
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We generally support shareholder resolutions
requesting that shareholders be given the
opportunity to vote on the adoption of rights plans. 43

Other large fund families, like Vanguard, take similar
positions.
·
Large shareholder antipathy to a target company's ability
to use a poison pill to block a hostile bid favored by
shareholders operates to very substantially limit target
management's ability to block a hostile bid out of selfinterest. For those companies that do not have staggered
boards, which still includes more than forty percent of U.S.
public companies, 44 a proxy contest to replace directors who
decline to redeem a poison pill in fact may operate more
quickly than a judicial challenge to the board's action even
with more shareholder oriented judicial review; .the process
of evaluating alternative strategies and seeking alternatives
to the bid, allowed under even the chancery court's most prostockholder formulation, still allows delay that could easily
run six or more months. And even where staggered boards
are in place, a strategy of disregarding the views of a
majority of shareholders, while lawful when stated out of
context, 45 is hardly attractive as a matter of investor
relations.

43
Summary of Proxy Voting Guidelines, at http://personal.fidelity.com
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003). There is evidence that poison pills are most
effective when coupled with a staggered board because the board structure
prevents an immediate proxy fight to replace the board in favor of
directors who will redeem the poison pill. See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John
C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful Antitakeouer Force of
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887
(2002). Fidelity's voting policies also dictate votes in favor of proposals to
eliminate staggered boards.
44
Bebchuk et al., supra note 43, at 896.
45
See TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 'II 94,334 (Del. Ch. 1989) (Board not required to redeem a poison pill
even though eighty-eight percent of the target shareholders have tendered
their shares).
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In summary, the U.S. experience has been that a poison
pill has not frequently blocked a hostile bid, once made, from
being considered by the shareholders. The pill will give
target management that opposes the bid time to explain its
position, to negotiate with the hostile bidder, or to develop an
alternative strategy or bidder. Three critical corporate
institutions-independent
directors,
the
governance
Delaware courts, and the capital market--combine to cause
the pill to operate largely as a negotiating tool, rather than
as a means to maintain company independence. Without
this institutional infrastructure, however, it is a fair
assessment that the poison pill would have materially
interfered with the equilibration process that the United
States experienced during the 1980s and early 1990s.
Despite this appraisal of the poison pill's impact in
operation, it is important not to overstate just how benign
the pill turned out to be. In this respect, two qualifications
are especially important.
First, when coupled with a
staggered board, the pill is an effective defense, and the
empirical evidence suggests that in this context the pill has
allowed management in an economically significant number
of cases to prevent shareholders from making a decision
about whether to accept a hostile bid. 46 Second, we simply do
not know whether courts now would allow a target
corporation to decline to redeem a poison pill in the face of
the kind of offer that played a significant role in the 1980s
equilibration process: a junk bond financed bust-up offer
made by takeover entrepreneurs whose strategy is to sell the
parts of the company to more efficient users of the target's
assets. Because such a bid contemplates a major change in
corporate strategy, may involve forms of payment that are
more difficult to value, and may be made by individuals who
are not part of the business mainstream, it is difficult for the
courts, and I expect for the target directors, to sort out
management's actual motive for resisting the offer. It is in
this circumstance that a clearer standard-like the chancery
court's position before Time- Warner that, after a target board
46

Bebchuk et al., supra note 43.
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has had the time to explain, negotiate and seek out another
bidder, the shareholders have the chance to accept or reject
the bid47-is a better outcome. And it is in this circumstance,
likely of real economic importance because of the need for
outsiders to make the kind of changes that are difficult for
insiders to see, and where the transaction functions most
plainly as an equilibrating mechanism, that the pill may still
be a serious economic problem. 48

V. IMPLICATIONS OF THE U.S. EXPERIENCE FOR
THE POISON PILL IN JAPAN
The United States experience can provide some guidance
for how Japan deals with the Commercial Code's
authorization of a poison pill. To be sure, there are
important limits on the relevance of the American experience
to Japan. Japanese industrial organization and Japanese
corporate governance differ markedly from that of the
United States, which surely limits the extent to which the
U.S. experience is transferable. Nonetheless, poison pills are
a U.S. phenomenon, so it is the only source of experience
that is available. Thus, while remaining attentive to the
difficulties of generalizing from a single country's experience
in the face of important inter-country differences, we have to
take guidance from wherever we find it, albeit with a grain
(or pillar) of salt.
The first, and most important, point is hardly limited to
the pill. Allowing the capital market to operate as a
mechanism to force corporations to respond to external
environmental change is an important macroeconomic factor.
It is especially important when other change inducing
mechanisms, most notably government, may not only be
ineffective, but may be affirmative barriers to change. In
this setting, the role of institutional infrastructure to cabin

47

See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch.

1988).
48

point.

I am grateful to Steve Fraidin for his repeated reminders of this
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the operation of the pill somewhere short of its capacity is
critical.
This argument, of course, is not economics, but political
economy. Mancur Olson famously predicted that interest
groups with stakes in the current structures of economic
organization will act to preserve the status quo and the size
of their piece of the pie even if their actions actually reduce
the overall size of the pie. 49 Thus, it may be politically na'ive
to imagine that those who favor the status quo will be unable
to prevent a reduction in the pill's effectiveness. Certainly
the experience in the United States, especially at the state
level, counsels that politics played an important role in
setting the policy with respect to defensive tactics. 50
The second point is that the pill has "worked" in the
United States-that is, it has been largely but not
exclusively used to support seeking a better deal for the
shareholders rather than simply to block a bid-because
independent directors, courts, and active institutional
investors have all combined to police the uses to which the
pill actually is put. The next step, then, is to assess what
institutions can play that ameliorating role in Japan.
Here the courts win by default. Traditional Japanese
corporate governance does not contemplate independent
directors of the character that has proven so important in
the operation of the poison pill in the U.S. And while recent
Commercial Code amendments allow Japanese corporations
to elect a U.S. style governance structure with outside
directors staffing governance committees, there is reason to
be skeptical of the impact of the change. First, Japanese
corporate law does not require an "outside" director to be
"independent" in the sense that term is used in the U.S. 51
49

See MACUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND SOCIAL RIGIDITIES (1982).
50
In this respect, it likely has been beneficial that Delaware's race,
whether to the top or the bottom, has been with the Federal government,
not with other states. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware's Competition, 117
HARv. L. REV. 588 (2003); GILSON & BLACK, supra note 2, ch.23.
51
See SHOHO, art. 188 (Japan). The distinction between "outside"
directors as defined by the Japanese Commercial Code and "independent"
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Furthermore, early reports suggest a limited response to the
invitation to adopt a U.S. governance structure. AB of midJune, only thirty-six listed Japanese companies had
committed to adopting the new governance structure. 52 Even
for that group, the U.S. experience strongly suggests that the
effectiveness of even independent directors depends on a
shared vision of their function that depends on the situation
and requires time to develop.
We can thus expect that the burden of assuring the
sensible operation of the poison pill will fall to the Japanese
courts, just as it did to the Delaware courts. And it would be
a serious mistake to underestimate the weight of that
burden. Because the Commercial Code amendments that
now allow a poison pill in Japan are technical rather than
substantive, the Japanese court will be operating without
legislative guidance. Thus it will be up to the courts to write,
through the accretion of judicial decisions, a poison pill
"code" that will give transaction planners for both bidders
and targets guidance concerning the operational rules of a
Japanese market for corporate control. This was the mantle
that the Delaware courts took up more than fifteen years
ago, and which they have yet to fully discharge; most starkly,
we still do not know whether a target board, whose reason
for blocking an offer is simply that the shareholders may
disagree with the board over the company's "fundamental
value" or the appropriate time to sell the company, may
block the offer by declining to redeem a poison pill. 53 If this
is the performance of the commercial court with the most
takeover experience of any in the world, the Japanese courts
confront a serious challenge.

directors as contemplated under U.S. law is discussed in Ronald J. Gilson
& Curtis J. Milhaupt, Choice as Regulatory Reform: The Case of Japanese
Corporate Governance (Feb. 2004) (working paper, on file with the
author).
52
David Pilling, Japanese Shifting to Global Standards, FIN. TIMES,
June 16, 2003, at 1.
53
Chancellor Chandler nicely explains how the Delaware Supreme
Court has managed this dance. Chandler, supra note 29.
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When I delivered a precursor to this Article at the
Symposium in Tokyo, I commented that assigning to
Japanese courts the role of creating a code, as opposed to
applying a legislatively enacted code to the cases before
them, seemed an oddly common law pattern in a legal
system whose roots lie in the civil law. Professor Kanda
rightly rebukes this reliance on formal differences between
legal systems, reminding us that the divergence between
different common law jurisdictions and between different
civil law systems may be as large as the divergence between
the two legal systems. 54
At the Symposium, I also suggested that the abuse-ofrights doctrine, invoked so broadly by the Japanese courts to
protect expectations of lifetime employment from a statute
that as a technical matter dictates employment-at-will, 55
could be used as a model to develop case law that provides a
nonstatutory constraint on the use of the poison pill to block
needed economic change. Professor Kanda again properly
corrects my superficial analysis of Japanese law.
My
attraction to the Japanese courts' experience with the abuseof-rights doctrine was simply the court's creation of a judicial
doctrine that restricted the operation of a statute that on its
face was not restricted, which is the functional task the
courts will confront in constraining the operation of the
poison pill. Professor Kanda reminds us that what is
important is not the particular judicial doctrine-on
reflection, it seems odd for me to have imagined that the
Japanese courts would import a largely labor law doctrine
into company law-but that a doctrine be available to serve
as a vehicle for the effort. As he suggests, the Commercial
Code in sections 280-10 and 280-39( 4) explicitly invites the
necessary doctrinal development by providing that
54

Hideki Kanda, Does Corporate Law Really Matter in Hostile
Takeovers?: Commenting on Professor Gilson and Chancellor Chandler,
2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 67.
55
See KAzUO SUGENO, JAPANESE EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW 395-98
(Leo Kanowitz trans., 1992); Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Lifetime
Employment: Labor Peace and the Evolution of Japanese Corporate
Governance, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 525-26 (1999).
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"significantly unfair" stock issuances may be set aside. 56
Certainly the term "unfair" is sufficiently empty that it can
be filled with whatever substance the court concludes is
appropriate.
I offer a final, and now appropriately tentative,
speculation concerning the· development of judicial
constraints on the operation of the poison pill. Recently, the
Japanese courts have struck down the issuance of shares to a
bidder favored by target management based on an
assessment that the issuance's primary purpose was to
protect target management. While the willingness of the
courts to strike down defensive action is encouraging, I
believe analysis of motivation will prove insufficient in
Japan, just as it did in Delaware, 57 to distinguish between
appropriate and inappropriate defensive tactics.

VI. CONCLUSION
The Commercial Code amendments that in effect
authorize Japanese corporations to adopt a poison pill launch
a major economy on a problematic course made even more
difficult because, after some dozen years of recession,
meaningful economic reform now seems to be taking hold.
The market for corporate control holds the promise of
accelerating that recovery by providing a reform vector that
is not constrained by governmental rigidities. The U.S.
experience with the poison pill provides some guidance for
that enterprise. Of course, that guidance will have to be
refracted through the prism of Japanese institutions to be
useful, but even one data point is better than none. From
the perspective of an interested academic viewing the
Japanese corporate governance from a distance, it will be
fascinating to watch the poison pill experience replayed in
another system. For those of us who have been critical of
how the Delaware courts have dealt with the poison pill,
having a second data point will be extremely interesting.

56

57

Kanda, supra note 54, at 73.
See Gilson, supra note 27.

